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Foreword
This report is the sixth and last in a series devoted to the ﬁrm-level determinants of
export and economic performance. The series started in 2007 with the Happy Few
report. It is based on the EFIGE survey of European ﬁrms organised by a Bruegel-led
team of European researchers from seven centres, with the support of the European
Commission and the UniCredit Group. Five years and countless pages later, it is time
to draw lessons from this ambitious research.
EFIGE REPORTS PUBLISHED BY BRUEGEL
• The Happy Few: the internationalisation of European firms, by ThierryMayer and
Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2007 (this report pre-dated the EFIGE survey and provided
the intellectual impetus for the project).
• Of markets, products and prices: the effects of the euro on European firms, by
Lionel Fontagné, Thierry Mayer and Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2009
• The global operations of European firms, by Daniel Horgos, Daniela Maggioni,
Fabiano Schivardi, Giorgio BarbaNavaretti, Matteo Bugamelli and Carlo Altomonte,
2011
• Still standing: how European firms weathered the crisis, by Gábor Békés, László
Halpern, Miklós Koren and Balázs Muraközy, 2011
• The triggers of competitiveness: the EFIGE cross-country report, by Carlo
Altomonte, Tommaso Aquilante and Gianmarco Ottaviano, 2012
• Breaking down the barriers to firm growth in Europe, by Aránzazu Crespo, Klaus
Desmet, Facundo Piguillem and Loris Rubini, 2012
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The ﬁrst lesson is a methodological one: whereas ten years ago economists and
policymakers routinely discussed competitiveness on the basis of aggregate trade
and investment ﬂows, it has become unimaginable to overlook the ﬁrm-level
dimension of international economic performance. As Richard Baldwin and I wrote in
the foreword of The Happy Few, nations do not trade, it is ﬁrms that trade. This simple
truth has become obvious and to speak of competitiveness without speaking of ﬁrms
is now as awkward as to speak of employment without speaking of job destruction
and creation.We are proud to have contributed to this intellectual and policy revolution.
Second, there is a strong and robust correlation between ﬁrm internationalisation and
ﬁrm performance. Simply put, and as documented again in this report, a ﬁrm that
exports tends to be alsomore proﬁtable, more productive andmore innovative. Again
thismay seemevident – but if it were to everyone, would globalisation be so disputed?
Third, the evidence collected within the framework of the project has conﬁrmed to a
remarkable extent that in diﬀerent countries, ﬁrmswith the same characteristics tend
to behave in the same way with respect to international competition. German
entrepreneursmay have a stronger propensity to export and invest abroad, but this is
not what explains Germany’s strong presence on international markets. Rather, it is
the density ofmedium-sized, skill-endowed and innovative ﬁrms that explains German
export performance. In this respect this report brings newevidence to the fore, showing
that in comparison, the less stellar trade performances of Italy and Spain are due to the
much higher density of small ﬁrms.
Fourth and consistent with the previous ﬁndings, to let domestic ﬁrms grow is one of
the surest ways to improve export performance. But as demonstrated by this report,
how to tear down barriers to growth is a country-speciﬁc question. Obstacles can be of
diﬀerent natures – they can originate in product, labour, technology and ﬁnancial
markets – and the binding constraints may be diﬀerent from one country to another.
So there is no one-size-ﬁts-all recipe for ﬁrm growth and exports, rather each
government must do its homework and identify domestic roadblocks.
Fifth, the relationship between ﬁrm characteristics and internationalisation is highly
non-linear. Exports and FDI involve ﬁxed costs and this gives rise to threshold eﬀects.
For this reason, long-distance exports and, to an even greater extent, FDI rely on a tiny
group of truly global ﬁrms. In comparison to those serving the domestic market, only
a minority of ﬁrms are serving even the closest neighbouring market. From a policy
perspective, this implies that the highest returns frompublic action are to be expected
from initiatives that ‘fatten the tail’ of globally competitive ﬁrms. If this can be done
EFIGE REPORT IV FOREwORd
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without picking thewinner is a question ofmajor relevance for all governments looking
for ways to improving competitiveness.
We at Bruegel are convinced that this research has profound policy implications,
especially in the current context of adjustment and rebalancing within the euro area.
We recognise, however, that the European policy conversation has not yet drawn the
full conclusions from it, andwe acknowledge that researchers themselves have yet to
contribute more convincingly to its upgrading. How countries in southern Europe that
need to reallocate labour and capitalmassively to the traded-goods sector and improve
their export-to-GDP ratio can do sowithout suﬀering amajor deterioration in their terms
of trade is, for example, a question we would wish to be able to provide more speciﬁc
guidance on.
So there is room for research, as the saying goes. The EFIGE research results have
already been considered important enough for the European Central Bank to launch a
research initiative– the CompetitivenessNetwork (CompNet) – that will build on them.
We hope that this will lead to further insights on competitiveness and the ways to
improve it.
The existing harvest, however, is rich enough already to provide to policymakers food
for thought and fuel for action.
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director, Bruegel
Brussels, August 2012
x
EFIGE REPORT IV FOREwORd
1854 Blueprint XVIII - 19.8.12 20/8/12 18:58 Page x
1Executive summary
Large ﬁrms contribute disproportionately to the economic performance of countries:
they are more productive, pay higher wages, enjoy higher proﬁts and are more
successful in international markets. The diﬀerences between European countries in
terms of the size of their ﬁrms are stark. Firms in Italy and Spain, for example, are on
average 40percent smaller than ﬁrms in Germany. The low average ﬁrmsize translates
into a chronic lack of large ﬁrms. In Italy and Spain, amere 5 percent ofmanufacturing
ﬁrms have more than 250 employees, compared to a much higher 11 percent in
Germany. Understanding the roots of these diﬀerences is key to improving the
economic performance of Europe’s lagging economies.
So why is there so much variation in ﬁrm size in diﬀerent European countries? What
are the barriers that keep ﬁrms in some countries fromgrowing? Andwhich policies are
likely to bemost eﬀective in breaking down those barriers? This policy report aims to
answer these questions by developing a quantitative model of the seven European
countries covered by the EFIGE survey (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain
and the UK). The EFIGE survey asked 14,444 ﬁrms in those countries about their
performance, their modes of internationalisation, their staﬃng decisions, their
ﬁnancing structure, and their competitive environment, among other topics1.
The fact that larger ﬁrms export more and innovate more suggests that barriers to
research and development and to trade are the main culprits that slow down ﬁrm
growth. Countries that face higher trade costs provide fewer opportunities for
businesses to become large. And a relative absence of R&D spending puts a break on
ﬁrm growth, leading to a size distribution skewed towards smaller ﬁrms. Trade and
innovation are not independent; they interact in signiﬁcant ways. A reduction in trade
costs, for example, tends to stimulate innovation, because it allows ﬁrms to become
larger, thus making it easier for them to bear the ﬁxed costs of R&D.
The framework developed in this policy report emphasises this complex interaction
1. See www.eﬁge.org, and footnote 2.
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between a ﬁrm’s decision to export and its decision to innovate. Diﬀerent barriers –
trade costs, innovation costs and tax distortions – aﬀect these decisions, and
ultimately determine a country’s ﬁrm size distribution. The model we put forward is
able to identify which barriers explain the relative absence of large ﬁrms in some
European countries. The framework is then used to quantitatively estimate the returns
from reducing the diﬀerent barriers. It thus provides a useful tool for practitioners
interested in understanding which policies are likely to bemore beneﬁcial in terms of
stimulating ﬁrm growth. But the use of themodel developed in this policy report goes
beyond identifying what drives diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distribution across
European countries. It is also able to analyse some of Europe’s pressing economic
issues, such as the impact of a possible breakup of the euro area.
An important conclusion is that in order to identify the barriers to ﬁrm growth, amodel
is needed that jointly analyses trade and innovation. For example, if trade were to be
ignored, themodel would predict that both Italy and Spain have high innovation costs.
However, once trade is introduced, the model ﬁnds that the high proportion of small
ﬁrms in Italy is mainly due to high innovation costs, whereas in Spain it is due to a
combination of high trade and high innovation costs. In other words, if Italy wants to
reduce barriers to ﬁrm growth, it should mainly focus on promoting innovation,
whereas in Spain the emphasis should also be on reducing trade costs and improving
access to international markets.
Although this gives some indication about which barriers to ﬁrm growth diﬀerent
countries face, it does not say anything about the expected magnitude of the eﬀects
of diﬀerent policies. Howdoes reducing trade costs compare in terms of eﬀectiveness
to reducing innovation costs or reducing labour taxes? To address this question, the
policy report estimates the eﬀect on ﬁrmgrowth and the ﬁrm size distribution of a one
percent drop in the diﬀerent barriers (innovation costs, trade costs and taxes). In nearly
all countries, reducing innovation costs has amuch greater impact than reducing trade
costs. On average, a one percent reduction in innovation costs is predicted to lead to
an approximately 1.2 percent increase in ﬁrm growth, whereas a one percent drop in
trade costs would increase ﬁrm growth by around 0.6 percent. This implies that
policymakers, who need to ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ between the reduction of certain barriers
and the potential returns from doing so, would achieve a much greater impact by
focusing on reducing the barriers to innovation.
Europe is in themidst of themost severe economic crisis since the Great Depression.
Fiscal austerity programmes are biting hard. The breakup of the euro area, once
considered a far-oﬀ doomsday scenario, is becoming a real possibility. Unfortunately,
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few models are able to shed light on the economic impact of these shocks. The
framework developed in this policy report is well equipped to analyse these questions.
In a ﬁrst application, it estimates the eﬀect of a 20 percent drop in government
expenditure on R&D in Spain. Although this drop only amounts to 0.1 percent of GDP,
the model predicts it will lead to a welfare drop in consumption of 2.7 percent. In a
second application, the prospect of a return to national currencies is considered.
Richard Baldwin has estimated this would lead to a drop in trade of 10 percent. Taking
this number, the model predicts that abandoning the common currency would result
in a welfare drop in consumption of between 7 percent and 15 percent. Larger
countries, such as Germany, have larger domestic markets, and would lose less
(around 7 percent), compared to smaller countries, such as Austria, which rely more
on international trade, and would thus lose more (around 15 percent). This estimate,
already large, should be viewed as a lower bound, since it only captures the negative
eﬀect euro-area breakupwould have on trade ﬂows, thus ignoringmanyother potential
impacts.
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1 Introduction
Large ﬁrms are more productive and more proﬁtable than their more modestly-sized
counterparts. They also pay higher wages and are more competitive in international
markets. Not surprisingly, economically more successful countries have a greater
share of large ﬁrms. In line with this picture, the ﬁrm size distribution in Europe diﬀers
signiﬁcantly in diﬀerent countries. In the seven countries analysed via the EFIGE
(European Firms in a Global Economy) dataset, Italy and Spain have smaller shares of
large ﬁrms (in terms of employees), compared to countries such as France, Germany
or the United Kingdom (the other countries covered by the EFIGE dataset are Austria
and Hungary2). Given the importance of large ﬁrms for a country’s economic
performance, Italian andSpanish policymakers should ask themselveswhat is keeping
their medium-sized businesses from growing further. Once the barriers to company
growth are identiﬁed, policymakers in those countries should act to reduce them.
Existing economic research provides some clues aboutwhat the barriers to ﬁrmgrowth
might be. Some authors highlight that trade costs are key (Eaton and Kortum, 2002;
Melitz, 2003; Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Ranciere, 2011). Countries that face higher
barriers to trade, because of more restrictive trade policies or higher transport costs,
provide fewer opportunities for businesses to become large. Others argue that the
capacity of ﬁrms to innovate and therefore grow is important (Acemoglu and Cao, 2010;
Luttmer, 2007, 2010). The relative absence of R&D spending puts a break on ﬁrm
growth, leading to a ﬁrm size distribution skewed towards smaller ﬁrms. Still others
cite size-dependent policies related to taxation, regulation and enforcement as
possible explanations for diﬀerences in ﬁrm size distributions (Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008). In countries where taxes or subsidies
beneﬁt smaller ﬁrms, one would expect a relative absence of larger ﬁrms.
4
2. The EFIGE dataset, prepared in the context of the EFIGE project, asked a total of 14,444 ﬁrms spread across seven
countries about their performance, theirmodes of internationalisation, their employment decisions, their ﬁnancing
structure and their competitive environment, among other topics. Datawas collected in 2010 and is representative
of manufacturing sectors in each country. The countries covered are Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Spain and the United Kingdom. The EFIGE project received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework
Programme, and from UniCredit Group. For details, see www.eﬁge.org.
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These diﬀerent explanations are not mutually exclusive; they interact, and therefore
cannot be analysed separately. For example, lower trade costsmay allowﬁrms to start
exporting, resulting in them becoming larger. This may facilitate innovation, because
larger ﬁrms canmore easily bear the ﬁxed costs of R&D. The link between innovation
and exporting has been well documented in the literature. Lileeva and Treﬂer (2010)
ﬁnd a strong relationship in Canada, during the trade liberalisation with the United
States. Bustos (2011) conﬁrms this for Argentine ﬁrms, while VanBiesebroeck (2005)
and De Loecker (2007) report that exporting increases productivity in, respectively,
sub-Saharan Africa and Slovenia. As shown by Treﬂer (2004), the productivity gains
associated with lower trade costs hold both at the ﬁrm level and at the aggregate
industry level. Given this evidence, it seems important to analyse the joint impact of
trade costs, innovation costs and other distortions on a country’s ﬁrmsize distribution.
This is key if we want to identify the barriers keeping ﬁrms in some countries from
becoming larger.
We start by documenting some of the basic stylised facts related to trade, innovation
and ﬁrm size in the seven European countries covered by the EFIGE dataset. Based
on Piguillemand Rubini (2012), we then propose a simplemulti-country framework to
analyse the interplay between trade, innovation and ﬁrm size. We calibrate themodel
using the EFIGE dataset, and show that it does a good job of accounting for the main
diﬀerences between diﬀerent European countries.
We then use our calibrated structural model as a tool for policy analysis. An important
conclusion is that analysing trade and innovation independently leads to misleading
results. In a closed economymodel with innovation, wewould conclude that both Italy
and Spain have innovation costs that are relatively high. In our framework, however, we
ﬁnd that the high proportion of small ﬁrms in Italy is mainly due to high innovation
costs, whereas in Spain it is due to a combination of high trade and innovation costs.
In other words, if Italy wants to reduce the barriers to ﬁrm growth, it should focus on
promoting innovation, whereas in Spain the emphasis should also be on reducing trade
costs and improving access to international markets.
Although this gives some indication of the barriers to ﬁrm growth that diﬀerent
countries face, it does not say anything about the expected magnitude of the eﬀects
of diﬀerent policies. To quantify these policies, we compare the eﬀect on ﬁrm growth
and on the ﬁrm size distribution of a one percent cut in the diﬀerent costs faced by
ﬁrms (innovation costs, trade costs, and taxes). We ﬁnd that the eﬀect on ﬁrm growth
of reduced innovation costs is double that of reduced trade costs. Therefore, if reducing
innovation costs and reducing trade costs are equally easy, policymakers should ﬁrst
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focus on innovation costs, since the expected returns are substantially greater.
In light of the current economic crisis, we also apply our framework to analyse the
eﬀect of austeritymeasures and a potential breakup of the euro area. The cuts in public
incentives for R&D in Spain are predicted to reduce consumption by2.7 percent. As for
the euro, abandoning the common currency would lead to a drop in consumption of 7
to 15 percent. This estimate should be viewed as a lower bound, since it only captures
the negative eﬀect such a breakup would have on trade ﬂows, thus ignoring many
other impacts.
The rest of the report is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the main stylised
facts for the seven EFIGE countries. Section 3 sketches the multi-country framework
of Piguillem and Rubini (2012). Section 4 calibrates the multi-country model and
identiﬁes the country-level innovation costs, trade costs and taxes that can account
for the diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distributions across countries. Section 5 presents
a number of counterfactual exercises of interest for policymakers. Section 6 analyses
the impact of the current economic crisis. Section 7 concludes.
EFIGE REPORT IV INTROduCTION
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72 Exports, R&d and the size
of ﬁrms
In this section we compare the ﬁrm size distributions of diﬀerent European countries,
and highlight diﬀerences between exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms.We also provide
evidence of the interaction between innovation and exports. The data for all ﬁgures
comes from the EFIGE database. Following Altomonte et al (2012), we exclude ﬁrms
that do not export but undertake some other international activity such as importing
or that are part of a multinational group.
2.1 Stylised facts
Figure 1 shows the ﬁrm size distributions in Germany, Italy and Spain. One feature
stands out: Italy and Spain have higher densities of small ﬁrms, whereas Germanyhas
more medium-sized and large ﬁrms. The average ﬁrm size in Spain and Italy is,
respectively, 49.3 and 42.7 employees, compared to the signiﬁcantly larger average
size of 76.4 employees in Germany. That Spain and Italy are diﬀerent from other
countries can be further seen in Figures 2 and 3. Indeed, the ﬁrm size distributions in
the other countries analysed in the EFIGE project (Austria, France, Hungary and the
UK) are similar to Germany’s. The sameholds true for the average ﬁrmsizes, except for
the UK, where ﬁrms tend to be substantially larger. More speciﬁcally, the average
number of employees per ﬁrm is 83.8 in Austria, 85.8 in France, 76 in Hungary and
119.2 in the United Kingdom.
As we know from The Happy Few policy report (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007), it is the
really large ﬁrms thatmakemost of the diﬀerence for a country’s performance. To see
if the diﬀerences between countries identiﬁed in the previous ﬁgures carry over to that
privileged groups of large ﬁrms, Figure 4 represents the ﬁrm size distribution in a
slightly diﬀerent way: the vertical axis shows the proportion of ﬁrms (in natural logs)
Fact 1: There are big differences in the size of firms across Europe.
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Figure 1: Firm size distribution in Spain, Italy and Germany
Source: Authors’ calculations from the EFIGE dataset.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the EFIGE dataset.
Figure 2: Firm size distribution in Germany, France and the UK
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Figure 3: Firm size distribution in Germany, Austria and Hungary
Source: Authors’ calculations from the EFIGE dataset.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the EFIGE dataset.
Figure 4: Firm size distribution in different European countries
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that is larger than the ﬁrm size (also in natural logs) given on the horizontal axis.
Although Figure 4 represents exactly the same information as in the previous ﬁgures
– for example that German ﬁrms on average are larger than Spanish ﬁrms – it
emphasises diﬀerences in the upper tail of the distribution, ie, in each country’s share
of very large ﬁrms. As can be seen, Italy and Spain are clearly below the other countries
for high values on the horizontal axis, indicating a relative absence of very large ﬁrms.
The same information is reported in Table 1, where we see that the share of ﬁrms with
more than 250 employees is 4.8 percent in Italy and 5.2 percent in Spain, compared
to 11 percent in Germany.
Figures 5 and 6 present the same data, but now separating exporting from non-
exporting ﬁrms. While exporters follow the same pattern as that shown by Figure 4,
the diﬀerences between Italy and Spain and the other countries for non-exporters are
less clear-cut. This suggests that international trade is key for understanding the
diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distributions in diﬀerent countries.
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10
Source: Authors’ calculations from the EFIGE dataset.
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Figure 5: Exporters’ size distribution in different European countries
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the EFIGE dataset.
Table 1: Firm share by size class
Country 10 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 249 more than 250
employees employees employees employees
Austria 30.3 % 36.0 % 22.8 % 10.9 %
France 32.0 % 39.0 % 21.1 % 7.9 %
Germany 23.5 % 38.4 % 27.3 % 10.7 %
Hungary 29.3 % 35.8 % 24.7 % 10.2 %
Italy 34.1 % 46.4 % 14.5 % 5 %
Spain 36.0 % 44.1 % 14.6 % 5.3 %
United Kingdom 30.9 % 38.9 % 25.0 % 5.1 %
Another established fact, emphasised by Bernard and Jensen (1999), and further
documented by Mayer and Ottaviano (2007), is that larger ﬁrms tend to export more.
In Figure 7 we use the EFIGE data and compare the size distributions of exporting and
non-exporting ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries. As in Figure 4, the horizontal axis shows
Figure 6: Non-exporters’ size distribution in different European countries
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Fact 2: Large firms tend to export more.
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Figure 7: Size distribution of exporting firms in different European countries
Source: Authors’ calculations from the EFIGE dataset.
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3. We use the Amadeus dataset, publised by Bureau van Dijk, which mainly reports balance sheet data, to
complement the EFIGE survey data. See https://amadeus.bvdinfo.com/. Austria is not included in Figure 8 because
Amadeus data only covers 6 percent of the ﬁrms in the survey.
4. Compared to an average coverage of 58 percent of ﬁrms, coverage for Austria, Germany and the UK was,
respectively, 7 percent, 28.5 percent and 22.3 percent. Coverage for the other countrieswas 92 percent for France,
64.8 percent for Hungary, 94 percent for Italy and 88 percent for Spain.
5. As in the previous ﬁgure, therewere substantial diﬀerences in coverage for diﬀerent countries. Austria is excluded
for the reasons stated above.
ﬁrm size (in logs) and the vertical axis shows the proportion of ﬁrms (in logs) being
larger than that size shown on the horizontal axis. As expected, exporting ﬁrms in all
countries are on average larger than non-exporting ﬁrms. This is reﬂected by the higher
curve for exporters than for non-exporters in all countries.
A third established fact is that exporting ﬁrms aremore productive andmore proﬁtable
than non-exporting ﬁrms (Mayer andOttaviano, 2007).Wehere document these same
stylised facts in the EFIGE dataset. Figure 8 plots the average proﬁts in thousands of
euros for exporters and non-exporters in the countries covered by EFIGE3. A clear
pattern emerges, with exporters having higher average proﬁts than non-exporters in all
countries. Those countries in which ﬁrms have relatively high reported proﬁts
(Germany and the United Kingdom) correspond to countries for which ﬁgures are
available only for a subgroup of ﬁrms because of problems with Amadeus data, the
quality of which is variable across countries (and particularly poor for Germany and the
United Kingdom)4. Larger ﬁrms were more overrepresented in Germany and the UK,
explaining why average proﬁts are higher. Figure 9 shows average total factor
productivity (TFP) for all countries by export status, as computed by Altomonte et al
(2012) using the EFIGE data5. As expected, exporters are on averagemore productive
thannon-exporters in all countries: 18.5 percentmore productive on average. There are
substantial diﬀerences between countries, with the productivity gap ranging from50.5
percent in Hungary to 8.6 percent in Spain.
2.2 The interaction between innovation and exports
The existing literature on endogenous ﬁrm size distributions has typically focused
either on closed-economymodelswith innovation (Acemoglu and Cao, 2010; Luttmer,
2007, 2010) or on open-economy models without innovation (Eaton and Kortum,
2002; Melitz, 2003). In the former case, diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distribution are
Fact 3: Exporting firms are more productive and more profitable.
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Figure 8: Average profits by export status
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the EFIGE dataset/Amadeus.
Figure 9: Average TFP by export status
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accounted for primarily by diﬀerences in innovation, whereas in the latter case they
come fromdiﬀerences in openness. However, aswe know fromboth the empirical and
the theoretical literature, there are signiﬁcant interactions between trade and
innovation (Constantini and Melitz, 2007; Lileeva and Treﬂer, 2011; Bustos, 2011;
Yeaple, 2005; Atkeson and Burstein, 2010; Desmet and Parente, 2010; Rubini, 2011;
Crespo, 2012; Piguillem and Rubini, 2012). Consistent with this, the EFIGE database
shows a strong relationship between a ﬁrm’s export intensity and its research
intensity, as highlighted by the next fact.
Using ﬁrm-level data from EFIGE, Table 2 shows a simple regression of innovation
(measured by the log of R&D as a share of sales) on exports (measured by the log of
exports as a share of sales). As expected, the relationship between exports and
innovation is positive for all countries, with the exception of Hungary, where the relation
is statistically insigniﬁcant.
Table 2: Trade and innovation
dependent variable: log(R&d/Sales)
Austria France Germany Hungary Italy Spain U.K.
log (Exports/Sales) 0.12 0.06* 0.12** 0.00 0.11** 0.10** 0.14**
(0.07) (0.025) (0.033) (0.091) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
log (Employees) -0.05* -0.04 -0.09** -0.34** -0.17** -0.23** -0.20**
(0.067) (0.027) (0.027) (0.085) (0.028) (0.032) (0.034)
Constant 1.10** 1.26** 1.56** 2.64** 1.71** 2.02** 1.68**
(0.305) (0.125) (0.146) (0.460) (0.118) (0.136) (0.154)
Observations 164 961 915 79 1270 805 819
**p<0.01, *p<0.05
In light of these diﬀerent stylised facts, this policy report will analyse the joint eﬀect
of trade and innovation on the ﬁrmsize distribution in diﬀerent European countries. The
main aim is to explore the relative contribution of trade costs and innovation costs to
the distribution of ﬁrmsizes. Given themajor diﬀerences in tax distortions fromcountry
to country, wewill also take those into account, as they are likely to aﬀect the results.
Fact 4: Exporting firms tend to innovate more.
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3 Framework
To understandwhich diﬀerences in each country’s structure account for the observed
diﬀerences in ﬁrmsize distributions, we need a theoretical framework that we can then
take to the data. Piguillem and Rubini (2012) develop such a framework, and this
section draws on their results. We here present its most salient features, abstracting
from technical details, which are further discussed in the Technical Appendix (page
39).
The model follows the standard Melitz (2003) framework, and is consistent with
empirical Fact 1 through Fact 4 in the previous section, as identiﬁed in the EFIGE
database. That is, in equilibrium themodel generates (i) large diﬀerences in ﬁrm size
distributions across European countries; (ii) a size premium of exporters over non-
exporters; (iii) a proﬁtability and productivity premiumof exporters over non-exporters;
and (iv) an innovation premium of exporters over non-exporters.
The model is dynamic and time is continuous. There are seven countries, corres-
ponding to the seven countries surveyed by the EFIGE project. There is a large number
of individuals in each country supplying labour and consuming goods produced by
domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Each good is producedmonopolistically by one ﬁrm. There
is entry and exit of ﬁrms. The numbers of goods (and ﬁrms) diﬀer in each country and
are determined in equilibrium.
Each ﬁrm takes the following decisions:
• Entry. To enter, a ﬁrmmust pay a ﬁxed cost. Firms enter as long as this cost is lower
than expected proﬁts. All new ﬁrms produce with the same technology.
• Pricing. A ﬁrm observes the demand for its good and sets its price and quantity to
maximise proﬁts.
• Exporting. If a ﬁrmhas not exported in the past, exporting requires a one-time sunk
cost.
16
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• Innovating. Firms make investments that increase their future productivity. We
describe this process in further detail below.
Innovation is a key element of themodel. By paying a ﬁxed cost, ﬁrms can reduce their
marginal cost. Thus, the greater the output, the greater the incentive to innovate, since
the gains from reducing themarginal cost are greater. Output will be high when (i) the
price set by the ﬁrm is low or (ii) the demand for the good is high. Firms with low
marginal costs charge lower prices, so that innovation allows ﬁrms to reduce their
prices. This further increases output and the incentive to innovate. The demand will
also be high when the income of the consumers is high or when the price of all other
goods is high.
Innovation costs diﬀer in diﬀerent countries by a scale parameter, κI. This parameter
plays an important role in our numerical analysis.
A second key element of themodel is export costs. If a ﬁrmwants to export, it must be
pay a sunk cost,κx and a variable transport cost, τx (Melitz, 2003). The sunk export cost
κx is paid one time and covers all destinations. Therefore, once a ﬁrm starts exporting,
it will continue to do so in all subsequent periods, and once it exports to one
destination, it will do so to all destinations. The sunk export cost κx is diﬀerent in
diﬀerent countries.
As is standard in the trade literature, we model the variable transport cost, τx as an
iceberg cost. That is, to deliver one unit of a good, (1+ τx) goods must be shipped.
Transport costs are diﬀerent in diﬀerent countries. These diﬀerences may reﬂect, for
example, the more or less central geographic location of the diﬀerent countries. To
understand diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distributions, the transportation cost τx is
another key parameter.
Key parameter 1: Innovation cost parameter κI. If the value of κI is 1 percent higher
in country A than in country B, then to improve productivity by a certain amount, a
firm in country A requires 1 percent more workers compared to an identical firm in
country B.
Key parameter 2: Export sunk cost parameter κx. If the value of κx is 1 percent
higher in country A than in country B, becoming an exporter in country A requires 1
percent more workers than in country B.
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Innovation and export decisions interact. Consider two identically productive ﬁrms,
but one exports while the other sells only to the local market. In that case, the exporting
ﬁrm will be larger than the non-exporter, and will more easily bear the ﬁxed cost of
innovation. As a result, exporting ﬁrms will grow faster than non-exporting ﬁrms, a
stylised fact for the United States observed by Bernard and Jensen (2001). Moreover,
we show that exporters grow at a rate that is independent of their size.
As is well known from the literature (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008), the ﬁrm size
distribution  depends  not  just  on  innovation  and  export  costs,  but  also  on  tax
distortions. In the model we allow for both corporate (proﬁt) taxes, τπ, and labour taxes,
τl. Those tax rates are diﬀerent in diﬀerent countries.
The dynamics of the model work as follows. Consider an entrepreneur deciding whether
to enter the market. She will do so if the entry cost does not exceed her expected
lifetime  discounted  proﬁts.  She  then  starts  oﬀ  with  a  small  ﬁrm  (in  terms  of
productivity, sales and employment), and in each period sets aside part of the proﬁts
for innovation. This allows her ﬁrm to grow. At some point, it will become worthwhile to
pay the sunk export cost and start exporting. This implies a large (lumpy) increase in
market size, and consequently an increase in her innovation and growth rates. At any
time, the ﬁrm may die, causing exit. To keep things simple, we assume this results
from an exogenous shock that the entrepreneur cannot prevent.
Note that innovation, entry and exit imply heterogeneity in productivity and therefore
a non-degenerate endogenous ﬁrm size distribution. In the next section we map the
distribution  in  the  data  into  the  distribution  in  the model  to  extract  the  diﬀerent
parameter values for the diﬀerent countries. This will help us to identify what generates
diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distribution in diﬀerent countries. It will also allow us to run
a number of counterfactual policy experiments.
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Key parameter 3: Variable export cost τx. If the value of τx is 1 percent higher in
country A than in country B, delivering one unit to a foreign consumer requires 1
percent more units to be shipped from country A than from country B. 
Key parameters 4 and 5: Corporate tax rate τπ and labour tax rate τl. 
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4 Calibration and results
In  this section we discuss how we use  the EFIGE data  to determine  the diﬀerent
parameter values of our model. We then discuss what we can learn from the diﬀerences
in  the  estimated  parameter  values  across  countries.  We  also  emphasise  the
importance of having a framework that jointly estimates the diﬀerent factors that aﬀect
a country’s ﬁrm size distribution.
4.1 Calibration and parameter values 
We focus on those parameters that are most relevant for the exercise. For further
details, we refer the interested reader to Piguillem and Rubini (2012). Some parameter
values are taken directly from the literature or the data, whereas others are calibrated
to moments in the data. The calibration targets are given in Table 3 and the calibrated
parameters in Table 4.
The targets make extensive use of the information in the EFIGE dataset. For a country’s
size, we take total employment in the EFIGE dataset, where we normalise Germany to
1.  Labour  tax  rates  are  from McDaniel  (2007).  Proﬁt  taxes  come  from  the Doing
Business 2012 report6. We obtain ﬁrm death rates in the manufacturing sector from
Eurostat.
Trade and innovation costs are set to target certain moments in the EFIGE data. The
variable trade cost τx is country-speciﬁc and is set to match the ratios of exports to
total sales7. Since we only know the total exports, not exports by destination, we use
a common τx for exporters in a given country exporting to any destination. The sunk
export cost, κx , determines the extensive margin, that is, the number of ﬁrms that
export. We set it to match the number of ﬁrms that export in each country. Lastly, the
6. http://www.doingbusiness.org/data
7. This requires aggregate data on exports and revenues. Unfortunately, while the EFIGE dataset collects information
on the share of exports to total revenues at the ﬁrm-level, it does not report the data on revenues separately. To work
around this we compute an average of trade volumes using employees as weights. This would yield the true
aggregate export volume if employees would be perfectly correlated with revenues.
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innovation cost, κI, which is also country-speciﬁc, is set to match the slope of the
distribution  of  exporting  ﬁrms  (with  more  than  30  employees).  Here  again,  we
normalise Germany’s innovation cost to 1.
Table 4: Parameter values
Country Innovation cost (κI) Sunk trade cost (κx) Variable trade cost (1+τx)
Austria 1.91 2.50 1.41
France 1.08 1.35 1.04
Germany 1.00 1.00 1.00
Hungary 0.99 2.28 1.48
Italy 1.47 1.92 0.95
Spain 1.12 1.03 1.58
UK 0.75 1.21 0.96
Source: Piguillem and Rubini (2012).
Before  further  analysing  the  calibrated  parameters,  it  is  useful  to  discuss  the
calibration targets in more detail, because they provide valuable information that will
help us interpret our ﬁndings. As Table 3 shows, several facts stand out. There are major
diﬀerences in export shares in diﬀerent countries. While exports make up 44 percent
of revenues for Austrian ﬁrms, that ﬁgure drops to 21 percent in Spain. Similarly, while
77 percent of Italian ﬁrms export, that share drops to 65 percent in Germany. The
relatively high share of Italian ﬁrms exporting was already highlighted in an earlier
EFIGE policy report by Barba Navaretti et al (2011). As for the slope of the distribution
of exporting ﬁrms, a lower negative number indicates a steeper slope, and therefore a
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Table 3: Calibration targets and relevant parameters
Country Employment Export Exporting Slope Profit tax Labour tax Firm death
volume firms
Austria 562,464 44% 82% 1.14 15% 12% 4%
France 2,903,820 27% 71% 1.11 8% 10% 6%
Germany 5,739,365 20% 65% 1.16 19% 10% 6%
Hungary 607,097 40%  74%  1.13  15%  9%  8% 
Italy 3,555,052  33%  77%  1.42  23%  14%  6% 
Spain  2,010,424  21%  68%  1.27  1%  9%  6% 
UK  3,768,663  26%  73%  1.06  23%  15%  8% 
Parameter  L τx κx κI τπ τI δ
Source: Authors’ calculations from EFIGE Dataset and Piguillem and Rubini (2012).
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smaller proportion of larger ﬁrms exporting. Consistent with this, in Italy and Spain the
typical exporter is relatively smaller, whereas in France and the UK there are many
large exporting ﬁrms. Taxes also diﬀer signiﬁcantly from country to country. Proﬁt
taxes, for example, are relatively high in the United Kingdom and Italy, they are low in
France, and practically zero in Spain8.
Figure 10 shows the match of the distribution of exporters. By construction, the slope
in the model is equal to the slope of a linear ﬁt in the data, so it is not a surprise that
the ﬁt is good.
8. This is the effective tax rate calculated in the Doing Business report for 2012 (the only year we have data for).
These rates do not have an eﬀect on the calibration of our parameters, only on the counterfactual exercises that
follow.
Figure 10: Model and data firm size distributions
Source: Authors’ calculations from the EFIGE dataset.
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4.2 discussion of parameter values
We now discuss what we can learn from the estimated diﬀerences in parameter values
in diﬀerent countries in Table 4. As mentioned before, all parameters are relative to
Germany.
Innovation costs κI. From Table 4 we see that the United Kingdom has the lowest cost
of innovation; Germany, France, Spain and Hungary come next; and Italy and Austria
have the highest. While most of these values are expected, some may come as a
surprise. For example, Spain’s  innovation costs, while higher than Germany’s, are
substantially lower than Italy’s or Austria’s. This seemingly contradicts the perception
that Spain is a country in which innovation is costly. It also goes against the prediction
of standard closed-economy models, which would require innovation costs to be high
in order to explain the relative absence of large ﬁrms in Spain. To resolve this apparent
contradiction, our open-economy model shows that what is relatively costly in Spain
are trade costs (58 percent more than Germany’s, the highest in the sample) rather
than  innovation  costs. High  trade costs  imply smaller ﬁrms,  and  therefore  fewer
beneﬁts from innovation. This suggests that if innovation in Spain is low, it is due
primarily to high trade costs, and to a lesser extent high innovation costs. High trade
costs reduce the returns from innovation. This, added to the high cost of innovating,
leads to low innovation rates in equilibrium.
Trade costs τx. As already mentioned, marginal trade costs are highest in Spain. This
is partly oﬀset by a relatively low sunk export cost. Austria and Hungary also have high
export costs. Italy stands out as a country that is particularly good at exporting. Its
variable trade costs are low. This explains why so many Italian ﬁrms export and why
each exporting ﬁrm exports so much. It provides micro-foundations for Barba Navaretti
et al (2011), who ﬁnd that many Italian ﬁrms export, and when they export, they do
so in large amounts. The diﬀerence between Italy and Spain may also have to do with
their geographical location.
An important conclusion that we may extract from the calibration exercise is that the
source of misallocation that accounts for the high share of small ﬁrms in Italy and
Spain is diﬀerent. Italy has high innovation costs and low trade costs, whereas Spain
has both high trade and innovation costs. We can therefore conclude the following:
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4.3 The importance of accounting for all factors
The example of Italy and Spain suggests that it is important for all factors (innovation
costs,  trade costs and taxes)  to be  taken  into account when comparing ﬁrm size
distributions in diﬀerent countries. Not doing so would produce misleading results. To
see this more clearly, consider what the model would predict if we were not to allow for
trade. Table 5 compares the implied innovation costs in our model with those of a
closed-economy model. Take the case of Italy. To account for its ﬁrm size distribution
in a  closed-economy setting,  the model would predict  innovation costs  to be 18
percent higher than in Germany. Once we go to an open-economy framework, this
ﬁgure increases to 47 percent. Given that Italy is good at exporting, its estimated
innovation costs must increase to keep its ﬁrms from becoming too large.
Following this argument, one would expect that, when going from a closed to an open
economy, the estimated innovation costs should increase in countries that are good
at  exporting  and would  decrease  in  countries  that  are  not  so  good  at  exporting.
However, in a country such as Spain, with high trade costs, the estimated innovation
cost hardly decreases. This happens because of a market size eﬀect. Opening up the
economy to trade has a greater eﬀect on Spain than on Germany, because the relative
increase in the market size is larger for smaller economies. This mitigates the negative
eﬀect of Spain facing higher trade costs than Germany.
The importance of jointly analysing the diﬀerent factors when trying to understand
the ﬁrm size distribution is summarised by the following ﬁnding:
Finding 1 The relative absence of large firms in Italy is, in our framework, mainly
due to high innovation costs; the relative absence of large firms in Spain is due to a
combination of both high innovation and trade costs.
Finding 2 Analysing differences in the firm size distribution in different countries
abstracting from international trade, results in biased estimates that ignore the
importance of market size.
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Table 5: Innovation costs in closed and open economies
Country Slope Growth rate Innovation costs
Open Closed Open Closed Open Closed
Austria -1.14 -1.14 2.03% 2.03% 1.92 1.36
France -1.11 -1.14 2.81% 2.77% 1.08 1.00
Germany -1.16 -1.17 2.78% 2.76% 1.00 1.00
Hungary -1.11 -1.17 3.71% 3.64% 0.99 0.76
Italy -1.42 -1.46 2.37% 2.34% 1.47 1.18
Spain -1.27 -1.33 2.52% 2.45% 1.12 1.13
UK -1.06 -1.10 3.92% 3.84% 0.75 0.72
Source: Piguillem and Rubini (2012).
4.4 model validation
Before using the model to carry out counterfactual policy analysis, it is important to see
how well the theory captures the main characteristics of the economy. To do so, in this
section we discuss the performance of  the model  in relation to a number of non-
targeted aspects. In other words, we analyse if the model correctly predicts features
in the data that we are not matching by construction. We highlight three such features.
First, we study if innovation in the model is close to that in the data. We then analyse
two diﬀerent measures of labour productivity: wages and value added per worker.
Innovation. A problem with the theoretical notion of innovation is that it has no clear
counterpart in the data. In the model, innovation can be understood as any expenditure
that increases ﬁrm productivity. In the data, this includes research and development,
organisational  expenses,  marketing  expenses,  etc.  The  EFIGE  database  reports
information on the proportion of workers per ﬁrm dedicated to R&D activities, so we
compare this with the proportion of workers involved in innovation in our model. There
is  a  problem  of missing  data,  because many  ﬁrms  have  not  reported  their  R&D
employees.  We  exclude  those  ﬁrms  from  the  analysis.  Figure  11  shows  the
comparison of innovation in the model and data. Innovation is normalised to Germany’s
level, which matches the data by construction. Such normalisation is needed because
R&D is only part of innovation. The results are strikingly good for all countries except
the UK and Hungary. A reason why the model might fail for the UK is that many of these
ﬁrms perform  their R&D expenditures abroad, especially  in  the United States, as
documented by Griﬃth et al (2006).
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Figure 11: Innovation: model vs. data
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 12: Wages: model vs. data
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Wages. Another non-targeted aspect  by which we  can evaluate  the model  is  the
diﬀerence in wages in diﬀerent countries. Eurostat has information on the wage rate
in each of these countries. In Figure 12, we compare these to the ones produced by the
model in equilibrium. The ﬁt is exceptionally good in all countries except Hungary.
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Value added per worker. The last non-targeted aspect with which we evaluate the
model is value added per worker. The data comes from Eurostat. Once again, Figure 13
shows a good ﬁt in all countries except Hungary.
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Figure 13: Value added per worker: model vs. data
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Overall, the ﬁnding that the structure of the model captures well many of the features
of the economy that are not being matched by construction lends credibility to our
theoretical framework. This is key, as it allows us to use our calibrated model to do
policy analysis. This will be the focus of the next sections.
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5 Improving ﬁrm growth
Given that a country’s economic performance depends disproportionately on its largest
ﬁrms, the relative lack of large ﬁrms in some European countries is an important policy
concern. By jointly analysing the eﬀect of diﬀerent barriers we identiﬁed trade costs
as the main barrier to ﬁrm growth in Spain, and innovation costs as the main barrier in
Italy. Although this gives some idea of the areas in which policymakers should be
acting if they wish to promote ﬁrm growth, it does not say anything about the diﬀerent
potential impact of diﬀerent policies. The advantage of having a calibrated structural
model is that it allows us to carry out counterfactual exercises that quantify these
eﬀects. In particular, in this section we will estimate the impact of a reduction in the
diﬀerent barriers (innovation costs, trade costs and taxes) on the growth rates of
exporting ﬁrms and on the ﬁrm size distribution in diﬀerent countries.
5.1 Exporter growth rates
Starting with a partial equilibrium approach, in which we ﬁx aggregate variables such
as wages and the ﬁrm size distribution, Table 6 shows the percentage change in the
growth rates of exporters for a one percent reduction in innovation costs and a one
percentage point reduction in the other barriers. All results are as expected: a reduction
in any cost increases the growth rate of exporters. In quantitative terms, a reduction
of 1 percent in the innovation cost κI has a substantially larger eﬀect than a reduction
in any of the other parameters (except in Austria, where a reduction in trade costs has
a bigger impact). In order of declining importance, innovation costs are followed by
variable  trade  costs,  and  then by  taxes.  For  example,  the  growth  rate  of German
exporters is predicted to increase by 1.19 percent when reducing innovation costs by
1 percent, by 0.42 percent when reducing variable trade costs, by 0.28 percent when
reducing  proﬁt  taxes,  and  by  0.11  percent  when  reducing  labour  taxes.  We  can
therefore conclude the following.
Finding 3 Reduced innovation costs have, in our framework, a substantially larger
effect on the growth of exporting firms than reduced trade costs.
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Table 6: Counterfactuals in partial equilibrium: shocks to all countries
Change in Austria France Germany hungary Italy Spain uk
Innovation costs (κI) 1.16 1.19 1.19 1.22 1.16 1.17 1.24
Variable trade costs(τx) 1.24 0.62 0.42 0.21 0.69 0.68 0.49
Profit taxes(τπ)  0.20  0.11  0.28  0.21  0.34  0.01  0.37 
Labour taxes(τI)  0.13  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.14  0.09  0.16 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Piguillem and Rubini (2012).
This implies that policymakers, who need to secure a diﬃcult trade-oﬀ between the
reduction of certain barriers and the potential returns from doing so, would achieve a
much greater impact when focusing on reducing the barriers to innovation.
We can do the same analysis in general equilibrium where we allow aggregate variables
to change. Table 7 shows the general equilibrium eﬀects of a 1 percent reduction in
the diﬀerent German frictions on growth of exporters in all countries. When taking into
account general equilibrium eﬀects, the results are similar in terms of their relative
importance, but somewhat smaller in magnitude. Compare, for example, the eﬀect of
a 1 percent decrease in innovation costs κI in partial and general equilibrium, shown
on row one of Table 6 and Table 79. A 1 percent drop in innovation costs in Germany
increases exporter growth of German ﬁrms by 0.84 percent in general equilibrium,
compared to a higher 1.19 percent in partial equilibrium. The reason for this smaller
eﬀect is that in general equilibrium whenever exporter growth rates increase, exports
increase, competition in the other countries becomes tougher, and proﬁts decrease.
This  reduces  the demand  for German goods via an  income eﬀect.  Consequently,
exporter growth rates decrease, partially oﬀsetting the initial rise.
Table 7: Counterfactuals in general equilibrium: shocks to Germany
Change in Austria France Germany hungary Italy Spain uk
Innovation costs (κI) 0.31 0.14 0.74 0.06 0-.04 -0.06 0.14
Variable trade costs(τx) 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06
Sunk trade costs (κx) -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Source: Piguillem and Rubini (2012).
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9. We omit the results based on changes in taxes since the changes were too small.
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The  eﬀect  of  a  reduction  in  the  sunk  export  cost  is  also  interesting10.  Maybe
surprisingly, it lowers the growth rate of exporters. The intuition is that a smaller κx
increases competition: if more ﬁrms become exporters, more ﬁrms become large. This
reduces exporters’ proﬁts, and consequently their growth rates.
An additional aspect ignored by partial equilibrium analysis is the eﬀect a reduction in
barriers in Germany has on other countries. These are not negligible: in the case of
export costs, the change in growth rates in the other countries is close to half the
change in Germany. To describe how a shock in one country spills over to another,
consider  a  reduction  in  innovation  costs  in  Germany.  As  this  increases  German
innovation levels, export growth rates and exports, ﬁrms in other countries face greater
competition, reducing proﬁts and growth rates. There is also a secondary eﬀect via
wages. Since the labour endowment is ﬁxed, wages in the other countries decrease,
which raises proﬁts, and consequently growth rates. As we can see from Table 7, the
wage eﬀect dominates, so growth rates increase.
5.2 Slope of the distribution
We next  turn  to how diﬀerent shocks aﬀect  the ﬁrm size distribution  in diﬀerent
countries. The slope of the distribution of exporters is inversely proportional to the
growth rate of exporters. The counterfactual exercises decrease the innovation cost
by 5 percent and the trade costs by 5 percentage points. We then compute how the
distributions of exporting ﬁrms change. Figure 14 shows the diﬀerence in slopes
computed under general equilibrium for Germany. As can be seen, the eﬀect of a
reduction in innovation costs is substantially larger than the eﬀect of a reduction in
trade costs. In the EFIGE survey, 10.7 percent of German ﬁrms have more than 250
employees. Reducing the innovation cost by 5 percent would increase that share to
12.64 percent, compared to an increase to 10.98 percent when reducing the trade
cost by 5 percent. 
10. We did not analyse its impact in Table 6, since it has no eﬀect in partial equilibrium.
Finding 4Reducing innovation costs has a greater effect on the firm size distribution
than reducing trade costs.
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Figure 14: Counterfactuals in general equilibrium: effects on firm size distribution
in Germany
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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6 Eﬀects of the crisis
In the current economic crisis in Europe, there is great uncertainty about how diﬀerent
policy measures might  aﬀect  the  economy.  Our  structural model  is  equipped  to
quantify diﬀerent possible policy scenarios. In this section we focus on two speciﬁc
questions. How would a  reduction  in public spending on R&D aﬀect productivity,
consumption and welfare? And, maybe more importantly, what would be the impact
of the collapse of the euro?
6.1 Reducing public expenditures on R&d
In Spain it has been estimated that government spending on R&D dropped by about 20
percent between 2009 and 201211. In simulating this drop, we face two problems. The
ﬁrst is that innovation in the model covers not just R&D; the second is that we do not
know how public spending in R&D aﬀects private spending on R&D. To address the
ﬁrst problem, we assume that a  fraction of  innovation comes from R&D, and that
fraction  is such that  the share of  innovation relative to value added  in  the model
corresponds to the share of R&D relative to GDP in the data. To be speciﬁc, in Spain the
ratio of R&D to GDP was 1.39 percent in 2010. In the model, the ratio of innovation to
value added was 2.86 percent. Accordingly, we assume that half of the innovation
expenditures are R&D.
To  tackle  the  second  problem,  we  need  to  determine  how  a  reduction  in  public
expenditures aﬀects ﬁrm-level R&D. According to the EFIGE data, the government
ﬁnances  about  34  percent  of  R&D  in  Spain.  Assuming  that  private  R&D  remains
unaltered,  a 20 percent  reduction  in public R&D would  therefore  imply a drop  in
Spanish R&D of about 7 percent. Unfortunately, without a better theory of the eﬀect of
public R&D on total R&D, it is unclear what the eﬀects on private R&D will be. On the one
hand, public R&D may crowd out private R&D,  in which case private R&D, would
increase, mitigating the eﬀect of the fall in public R&D. On the other hand, it is likely that
there are complementarities between public and private R&D, so private R&D might
31
11. Spending decreased from €9.66 billion in 2009 and to €7.99 billion in 2012 (CCOO, 2012).
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actually fall, increasing the eﬀect of the drop in public R&D. Given that we do not have
a precise idea of which eﬀect is stronger, we take the naive view that private R&D
remains constant. Since half of the innovation expenditure comes from R&D, the 7
percent  drop  in  R&D  therefore  implies  a  3.5  percent  drop  in  overall  innovation
expenditure.
To match this 3.5 percent drop in innovation spending, the counterfactual exercise
assumes an increase in the innovation cost κI by 0.96 percent. The model predicts
that in steady state, Spanish value added would drop by 2.1 percent, while welfare
would decrease by 2.7 percent in terms of consumption units. These are huge eﬀects,
given that the 3.5 percent drop in innovation spending corresponds to a mere 0.1
percentage point drop as a share of manufacturing GDP.
6.2 Breakup of the euro area
While the breakup of the euro would lead to many unforeseen eﬀects, we here focus
exclusively  on  its  impact  on  trade.  Baldwin  (2006)  estimates  that  dropping  the
common currency would reduce trade volumes by up to 10 percent. To match this
number, in our counterfactual exercise we increase variable trade costs τx so that each
country’s exports fall by 10 percent. We focus on variable trade costs, rather than sunk
export costs, because exchange rate volatility is more likely to have a direct eﬀect on
the intensity of exports. Although the proportion of ﬁrms that export might also change,
this is likely to be an indirect eﬀect, in response to the overall drop in export intensity
of ﬁrms. 
We display our results in Table 8. Welfare, measured in terms of consumption units,
would drop by between 4 percent and 7 percent. In terms of value added, the negative
eﬀects are of a similar order of magnitude. Not surprisingly, the countries that face the
greatest losses are the countries with the smallest relative domestic markets: Austria
and Hungary.
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Finding 5 The 20 percent drop in public R&D expenditures experienced in Spain
reduced manufacturing value added by 2.1 percent and welfare (in consumption
units) by 2.7 percent.
Finding 6 A breakup of the euro would reduce welfare (in consumption units) by
between 7 percent and 15 percent.
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Table 8: Breakup of the euro area
Percentage change in
Country Transport costs welfare Value added
Austria 9.87% -15.22% -11.76%
France 8.71% -10.48% -8.24%
Germany 4.29% -7.30% -5.75%
Hungary 6.79% -11.06% -8.42%
Italy 6.33% -7.84% -5.91%
Spain 3.27% -7.30% -5.74%
UK 6.09% -7.35% -5.63%
Source: Author’s calculations based on Piguillem and Rubini (2012).
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7 Conclusions and
recommendations
This policy report has analysed the joint impact of innovation costs, trade costs and
taxes on the ﬁrm size distribution in diﬀerent European countries. Doing so has allowed
us to understand why some countries, such as Italy and Spain, have relatively few
large ﬁrms, compared to other countries, such as France, Germany and the United
Kingdom.
To identify the barriers to ﬁrm growth, it is important to analyse the interaction between
trade, innovation and growth. Firms can only bear the ﬁxed costs of innovation when
the market is large enough. One way of expanding the market is through international
trade. A ﬁrm’s decision to innovate and its decision to trade are therefore intimately
linked.  Piguillem  and  Rubini  (2012)  provide  a  framework  that  incorporates  both
channels. We  calibrated  their model  to  the  EFIGE  database with  the  objective  of
understanding what the barriers to ﬁrm growth are in the diﬀerent European countries.
We  then quantitatively analysed which policies are  likely  to be more eﬀective  in
breaking down those barriers.
The main conclusions of the quantitative analysis are as follows:
First, in Italy high innovation costs prevent ﬁrms from growing, though the costs of
exporting are low. In contrast, Spanish ﬁrms do not achieve high growth rates because
of a combination of high trade and high innovation costs. In as far as having large ﬁrms
is desirable because of their higher productivity and proﬁtability, this provides an
indication to policymakers in these countries where the barriers to ﬁrm growth lie.
Second,  ignoring  trade  when  analysing  ﬁrms’  incentives  to  innovate  may  be
misleading. In the case of Spain, for example, the low rate of innovation is partly due
to the high trade costs. Facilitating access to foreign markets would therefore not only
increase trade volumes, it would also lead to more innovation.
34
1854 Blueprint XVIII - 19.8.12  20/8/12  18:58  Page 34
EFIGE REPORT IV CONCLuSIONS ANd RECOmmENdATIONS
35
Third, the return on reduced innovation costs is in general greater than the return on
reduced trade costs. Except  in Austria,  the impact on ﬁrm growth is greater when
innovation  costs  drop.  Policymakers,  who  need  to  ﬁnd  a  trade-oﬀ  between  the
reduction of certain barriers and the potential returns from doing so, would achieve a
much greater impact by focusing on reducing the barriers to innovation.
In addition to analysing diﬀerences in the ﬁrm size distribution in diﬀerent European
countries, we have also used our model to study the quantitative impact of the current
economic  crisis  on  output  and  consumption.  This  allows  us  to  state  two  more
conclusions:
Fourth, ﬁscal austerity measures, such as the reduction in public spending on R&D, are
likely  to have  large negative consequences. For example,  the 20 percent drop  in
government expenditure on R&D in Spain (which corresponds to 0.1 percent of GDP)
is predicted to reduce Spanish welfare by 2.7 percent.
Fifth, when focusing exclusively on the trade eﬀects of a possible breakup of the euro
area, we ﬁnd that the well-being of Europeans would drop by between 7 percent and
15 percent. This estimate should be viewed as a lower bound: going back to national
currencies would have many other negative consequences that go beyond the decline
in cross-border trade.
To summarise, there is a need for quantitative models of trade and innovation if we
want to identify the barriers to ﬁrm growth and if we wish to analyse which policies are
likely  to  be  more  eﬀective  in  breaking  down  those  barriers.  Given  the  complex
interaction between trade and innovation, such models are also useful for analysing
the impact of diﬀerent policies and shocks. The goal of this policy report has been to
provide such a framework.
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This appendix presents the functional forms used in the model, together with the
conditions that solve for the equilibrium. For greater details, see Piguillem and Rubini
(2012).
A1 Preferences and technologies
The preferences of the consumer in country i are given by the following utility function,
for i = 1,2:
∞
Ui ({qi (ω,t)}ωΩi(t)) = ∫ e–ρt ln Qi (t)dt,
0
σ/(σ–1)
Qi (t) = [∫ qi (ω,t)(σ–1)/σdω]
Ωi(t)
where ω is the name of the good consumed, and Ωi is the set of goods available in
country i. σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods.
Production.  Each  instant,  a  continuum  of  ﬁrms  produce  diﬀerentiated  goods
monopolistically. Proﬁts accrue to domestic consumers. Given productivity level z and
labour services n, the production function is 
y(ω; z, n) = z1/(1–σ) n
Innovation. Firms innovate to increase their productivity. We choose a functional form
for the innovation cost that guarantees that in equilibrium Gibrat’s law emerges (growth
rates are  independent of size). The  innovation cost  is  in  labour units. The cost of
increasing productivity by an amount z. depends on the current productivity level z
and is given by 
39
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κIiz z
. 2
ci (z, z
. ) = —– (– )2 z
Exporting. A ﬁrm can export by incurring a sunk export cost equal to κx units of labour.
Once a ﬁrm becomes an exporter,  it  remains an exporter until  it dies. Exports are
subject  to  iceberg  trade costs. Trade depletes a proportion τx of  the good. So  if a
consumer  consumes an amount q of  a  good,  the exporter must  ship  an amount
(1+τx)q.
Entry and exit. There is a large pool of potential entrants that can enter anytime by
incurring an entry cost equal to κ units of labour. After paying the entry cost, entrants’
productivity is z = 1. In equilibrium, a measure M(t) of ﬁrms enter the economy each
period. Firms die with an exogenous probability δ.
We close the model by imposing labour market clearing and trade balance, which
determines the equilibrium price level and wages in each country.
A2 Steady-state equilibrium 
We identify a monopolistically competitive steady state equilibrium for this economy.
We therefore drop the time argument t. Also, we drop the name of the good ω and
diﬀerentiate  goods by  their  type z denoting  the measure  of  type z goods  in  the
economy µ(z).
Let wi be the wage rate in country i. Set wi = 1 as numeraire. The price of good type z
is p(z). The equilibrium price before trade costs for an exported good is the same as the
price of the same good sold domestically, so we do not introduce notation for the price
of an exported good. This price is set by the monopolist to maximise proﬁts subject to
the  demand  for  its  product.  This  demand  function  comes  from  the  consumer
maximisation problem:
max ln Qi
s.t.
∞ J σ/(σ−1)
Qi = [∫ ∑ qij(z)(σ−1)/σµj (z)dz]
1 j = 1
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J ∞ ∞
∑ ∫ (1+τij)pj(z)qij(z)dµj (z) = wiLi+∫πi(z)dµi(z) + Ri
j = 1 1 1
The last line is the budget constraint. πi(z) is proﬁts of a ﬁrm z. Ri is tax revenue. τij is
the iceberg cost to export one unit from country j to i, with τij = 0.
Let the right hand side be equal to Ii (for income). The demand for good z is 
qij(z) = ((1+τij)pi(z))−σPiσ−1Ii if ω  Ω(t)
where Pi is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate price,
J ∞ 1/(1−σ)
Pi = [ ∑ ∫ ((1+τij)pi(z))1−σdµi(z)]
j = 1 1
Firm proﬁt maximisation is done in two steps. The ﬁrst is a static decision: to choose
prices and quantities given the productivity of the ﬁrm to maximise variable proﬁts
(before innovation or sunk export costs). The second is a dynamic problem that ﬁnds
the optimal innovation rate and whether to export or not (for non-exporters).
It  is  straightforward  to  show  that  the  problem  of  maximising  proﬁts  given  their
productivity results in variable proﬁts are linear in z. Let the variable proﬁts be πdiz
and πxiz for non-exporters and exporters in country i.
The dynamic decisions solve the ﬁrm value function, given by
(ρ+δi)Vxi(z) = max πxiz−ci(z, z
. ) + Vxi (z)z
.
z.
For non-exporters, the dynamic problem consists on when to become exporters and
how much to innovate. Their problem is a stopping time problem:
T
Vdi(z) = max ∫ e−(ρ+δi)t [πdiz−ci(z, z. )]dt + e−(ρ+δi)T [Vxi (z)−κxi]z. (t),T 0
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New ﬁrms enter the economy whenever their expected proﬁts exceed the entry cost.
Assuming that new ﬁrms never choose to export immediately, the free entry condition
is κ = Vdi (1).
A3 Characterising the steady-state equilibrium
The exporter value function is
z. 2
(ρ+ δi)Vxi(z) = max πxiz − 1/2kIiz (– ) + Vxi(z)z.z. z
To solve this problem, we guess and verify that Vxi(z) is linear. The solution is the
productivity of exporters grows at a constant rate, and is therefore independent of ﬁrm
size. Thus, Gibrat’s law holds. This rate of growth is
z. ——— 2πxigxi = – = (ρ+ δi)(1−1−hxi),  hxi = —————
z                       (ρ+ δi)2-κIi
The rate of growth is increasing in exporter proﬁts and decreasing in innovation costs.
The value function in equilibrium is Vxi(z) = κIigxiz.
Firms, while non exporters, solve the following problem
κIi
(ρ+ δi)Vdi(z) = max{πdiz − ––g2diz + Vdi(z)gdiz},  ∀z  [1, zxi]
2
subject to a value matching condition
Vdi(zxi) = κIigxizxi − κxi
and a smooth pasting condition
Vdi(zxi) = κIigxi
The optimal growth rate is
Vdi(z)
gdi = ——
κIi
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Given this optimal growth rate, the value matching condition implies that the export
threshold is
(ρ+ δi)κx
zxi = ——————————————
(ρ+ δi)κIigxi−πdi−(1/2κIi)(κIigxi)2
Given this threshold, we can rewrite the solution for the non exporter growth rate by
introducing the ﬁrst order condition into the value function, which yields the diﬀerential
equation that solves for the optimal non exporter growth rate
gdi(z)gdi(z) 1
————————————————— = –
(ρ+ δi)gdi(z)−(πdi /κIi)−(1/2)g2di(z) z
This diﬀerential equation has no explicit solution. This is needed in order to ﬁnd the
distribution of ﬁrms. Therefore we approximate the solution by imposing the following
functional form
gdi(z) = (ai+biz2+ciz3)−1
and pin down the parameters by ﬁtting the numerical solution into this functional form.
Piguillem and Rubini (2012) show that this ﬁt is surprisingly good. 
We next characterise the steady state distribution. Deﬁne µˆ(t+dt, Z) as the measure
of ﬁrms with productivity z in period t. Deﬁne Z = [z1, z2] for some z2 > z1. The law of
motion for the measure of productivity is µˆ (t+dt, Z) = ∫z µˆ (t, z−z
.dt)e−δdtdz. That
is, the measure of ﬁrms with productivity z  Z is the sum of the incumbent ﬁrms that
had a productivity z−z.dt, dt periods ago, plus all the ﬁrms that were born and in
period t+dt had productivity z  Z. This expression can be reduced to µ(z) = e−δdt
µ(z−z.dt), and then further to δµ(z) = −µ(z)z. . For non-exporters, that is z [1,zxi],
this is δiµi(z) = −µi(z)gdiz. This is a ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation, with boundary
condition µi(1) = Mi. The solution to this equation is µi(z) = Miz(δi/gdi). Similarly, for
exporters, that is , for z > zxi,δµi(z) = −µi(z)gxiz. The boundary condition is µi(zxi)
= Mizxi(δ/gdi). Thus, the equilibrium distribution in country i is 
exp(δi(bi(1−z)+ci/2(1−z2)+di/3(1−z3)))z−aiδi), 
µi(z) = {if  z ≤ zxi Aiz−(δi/gxi), if  z>zxi
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where Ai = zxi(δi/gxi−aiδi) exp(δi(bi(1 − zxi) + ci/2(1 − zxi2 ) + di/3(1 − zxi3 ))).
Notice that the upper tail of this distribution is Pareto (the distribution of exporters)
This is Zipf’s law.
We can solve for the entire steady state equilibrium as a system of three equations
and three unknowns per country. The unknowns are πd, M, and the wage rate ω. Given
these variables, we can identify all the remaining variables in the model. The three
equations that pin down these variables are the free entry condition, labour market
clearing and trade balance.
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